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Abstract 
The concept of recognition (Anerkennung in German) has 
been in the center of intensive interest and debate for some 
time in social and political philosophy, as well as in Hegel-
scholarship. The first part of the article clarifies conceptually 
what recognition in the relevant sense arguably is. The 
second part explores one possible route for arguing that the 
„recognitive attitudes‟ of respect and love have a necessary 
role in the coming about of the psychological capacities 
distinctive of persons. More exactly, it explores the 
possibility that they are necessary in the kind of 
intersubjective relationship in which normal human infants 
engage in the pre-linguistic communicative practice of 
pointing things to others, as described by Michael 
Tomasello. If an incapacity to participate in the already 
Gricean communicative practices of pointing makes it also 
impossible for the infant to learn symbolic communication, 
and if without the immediately intrinsically motivating other-
regarding attitudes of recognition communicative pointing 
does not get off the ground (at least among the most 
intelligent  animals currently known to exist), then the 
capacity for recognition may be a decisive difference 
between humans and their closest non-human relatives. That 
is, it may be why only human infants, but no other animals, 
are capable of embarking on a developmental journey that 
normally leads to full-fledged psychological personhood. If 
this is so, then the concept of recognition, today mostly 
discussed in social and political philosophy and Hegel-
studies, could turn out to be a very useful tool in cognitive 
scientific work interested in specifically human forms of 
social intentionality, cognition, volition and so forth. 
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1. Recognition as an ethical and ontological 
concept 
The aim of this paper is to bring together two discussions: 
on the one hand the discussion on the concept of recognition 
(Anerkennung) in social and political philosophy and Hegel-
scholarship, and on the other hand the discussion on 
communicative pointing in primatology and evolutionary 
anthropology. The aim is to clarify what exact role 
intersubjective attitudes of recognition have in the 
development of specifically human forms of social 
intentionality, cognition, volition and so forth. 
 The concept of recognition (or Anerkennung in 
German) has been in the center of intensive interest and 
debate for some time in social and political philosophy,
1
  as 
well as in Hegel-scholarship.
2
 It is widely agreed that 
recognition is, as Charles Taylor (1992, 26) puts it, “a vital 
human need”, that lack of adequate recognition can be a 
serious problem in human relationship, and that social and 
political demands and struggles are often about recognition 
between individuals or groups. But what exactly is 
recognition in the relevant sense?
3
 
When discussing the theme in English, one needs to 
distinguish, to start with, between three different meanings 
of the word „recognition‟. First, there is „recognition‟ in a 
sense in which it is synonymous with „identification‟. In this 
sense one can recognize, i.e. identify anything generically, 
qualitatively or numerically (say, as a face, as a friendly 
face, or as John‟s face, respectively). 
Secondly, there is „recognition‟ in a sense in which it is, 
at least roughly, synonymous with „acknowledgement‟. We 
acknowledge norms, institutions, statuses, principles, rules 
and claims as binding, valid or legitimate, reasons as good, 
values as genuine, facts as licensing or forcing conclusions 
with other facts, something as giving reasons, as valuable, or 
the case, and so forth.  
Thirdly, whereas anything can be identified, and whereas 
only normative or evaluative entities can be acknowledged, 
there is a sense of the word „recognition‟ in which it is 
appropriate to recognize only persons. 
Even if all three senses of „recognition‟ are no doubt in 
many ways interrelated, and even if especially the first and 
the third sense are often indiscriminately confused with each 
other in political and social philosophy, the directly relevant 
sense is the third one. But what is recognition in this sense. 
                                                 
1 See Thompson 2006; van den Brink & Owen 2007; Schmidt am 
Busch & Zurn (forthcoming). 
2 See Siep 1979; Wildt 1982; Honneth 1995; Williams 1992 and 
1997. 
3 Details of the view on recognition and personhood presented in 
this paper are discussed in Ikaheimo 2007, Ikaheimo 2010 and 
Ikaheimo & Laitinen 2007. 
Looking at the debates, pretty much everyone agrees, 
explicitly or implicitly, that recognition is some kind of an 
affirming attitudinal response to persons or groups of 
persons. In other words, it is, at least implicitly, agreed that 
to have recognition towards others is to have some kind of 
practical, and somehow affirmative, attitudes towards them.  
We may draw closer to a definition of recognition in the 
relevant sense by taking a look at what recognition is 
thought to do. Here there are basically two kinds of views 
present in the discussions. On the one hand there are 
qualitative views, widespread in social and political 
philosophy, according to which recognition changes what it 
affects by changing its qualities – and as a rule changing 
them for the better. Thus, it is thought that being the object 
of recognition by others is good for a person‟s psychological 
life, his self-identity, self-relations, and psychological 
resources for self-realization and so forth. It is also widely 
thought that recognition between individuals and groups is 
in various ways good for the quality of social or political 
life. In principle „goodness‟ can be understood here in a 
functional, or in an ethical sense, or both. Thus, it can be 
argued either that more recognition makes functionally 
better individuals and/or societies, or that it makes ethically 
better individuals and/or societies, or both. 
On the other hand, there are ontological views, put forth 
by a number of contemporary neo-Hegelian philosophers 
like Robert Brandom, according to which recognition makes 
what it affects the kinds of beings they are. Namely, it 
distinguishes us and our „spiritual‟ life-form from mere 
animals and their natural life-form. I believe we can usefully 
translate this view by saying that according to it recognition 
is essential in what is distinctive of persons and their life-
form.  
But is there a way to conceive of both the qualitative and 
the ontological views as talking of the same thing? Or to put 
this in another way, is there really some phenomenon called 
„recognition‟ that could do both jobs – both make our lives 
as persons (individually and/or collectively, functionally 
and/or ethically) better, and make us psychological persons 
in the first place. I take it that according to Hegel‟s original 
idea recognition is such a phenomenon, and even if Hegel 
himself never gave anything like a simple definition of 
recognition that would make it immediately clear how 
exactly this could be so, we can explicate the concept so that 
it does make good sense. According to the explication 
attitudes of recognition are attitudes of taking something/-
one as a person. But what exactly is it to take something/-
one as a person in this Hegelian sense of recognizing it/her?  
There are two candidates, both of which, I suggest, are 
species of the genus „recognitive attitude‟. One of these is 
central to Robert Brandom‟s neo-Hegelian theory of 
semantic norms. In Brandom‟s (1999) view, to recognize 
someone is to take her as having authority on one. The point 
is that mutually taking others as having authority on one‟s 
conceptual grasp of the world is constitutive of the space of 
semantic norms, or of the collectively administered ways of 
carving up the world in linguistically informed thought and 
perception. The details of Brandom‟s account are not 
important here, but only the general idea about the necessary 
connection of shared or „social‟ norms on the one hand, and 
mutually taking others as having authority, and thereby 
sharing authority, on the other hand. 
It is arguably carving reality at a very important joint to 
say that persons differ from mere animals (i.e. those animal 
that are not persons psychologically) in that the former are 
governed by social norms. On this view the capacity to 
participate in the administration of social norms is the 
person-making psychological capacity (quite obviously it is 
a cluster of capacities) and this necessarily involves the 
capacity to take others as having authority on one, or as 
sharing authority with one. No-one can be governed by 
social norms without being moved by their authority on one, 
which on this analysis boils down to the authority of the 
relevant other subjects. And the others‟ having authority on 
one requires that one takes them as authorities on oneself. 
On the other hand, one can share authority with others, and 
thus participate in the administration of social norms only if 
the others take one as having authority on them. Taking 
something/-one as having authority on one is thus here what 
it means to take something/-one as a person, i.e. to have a 
practical attitude of recognition towards it/her; and the 
practical and hence motivating or „moving‟ significance of 
„an authority‟ is the corresponding practical person-making 
significance in light of which persons see each other. 
From Hegel‟s point of view this however is only half of 
the story of the role of recognition in our being spiritual 
beings, or in other words of the role of taking others as 
persons in personhood. What is absent from Brandom‟s 
story is whatever it is that Hegel has in mind when he talks 
of love as a form of recognition.
4
 On the full Hegelian 
picture, or my construal of it, recognition in Brandom‟s 
sense – let us call it respect – and recognition as love are 
two species of the genus recognitive attitude, or two ways of 
taking something/-one as a person.
5
 But if respect as a way 
of taking something/-one as a person is taking it/him as 
having authority on one, what is love as a way of taking 
something/-one as a person? I believe the best way to make 
sense of this is to explicate love as the attitude of taking 
something‟s/someone‟s well-being or happiness as 
intrinsically important, or in short taking something/-one as 
an end in herself. Analogically to respect, this is not 
primarily a matter of having beliefs about the object, but of 
being „moved‟ by her – a volitional response of caring 
                                                 
4 See Hegel 1978-9, § 436. To be exact, Brandom‟s view arguably 
also lacks a robust sense of recognition transforming the 
recognizer‟s basic motivations and thus of what I mean by a 
„volitional response‟ (see note 6). See Brandom 2007, where all the 
motivational work in recognition is apparently done by desire. In 
presenting Brandom‟s theory as an example of the view I am 
proposing, I am thus idealizing it somewhat. 
5 The idea that recognition has several types or species comes from 
Honneth 1995. 
intrinsically or non-instrumentally.
6
 And analogically to the 
practical significance of „authority‟ attributed by the 
recognitive attitude of respect, the practical significance 
attributed by the recognitive attitude of love is something 
like an „end in herself‟, or „someone whose well-being or 
happiness is intrinsically important‟. 
Now, love is no doubt in many ways good for persons, 
but isn‟t it exaggerated to say that it is constitutive of their 
being persons in the first place? I do not think so. The idea 
of self-love in the sense of intrinsic concern about one‟s own 
well-being or happiness as being constitutive of personhood 
can be found in various versions throughout the history of 
philosophy from Aristotle, through John Locke to Harry 
Frankfurt. Roughly, the idea is that whereas mere animals 
are moved by desires or other immediately motivating 
states, persons are moved by self-regarding concerns that 
transcend the immediately given and maximally encompass 
the goodness of one‟s life as a whole. It is really not much 
more scandalous to claim that the capacity to love also (at 
least some) others in this sense is part of what constitutes 
the psychological capacities of full-fledged personhood. 
Clearly at least a complete incapacity to be intrinsically 
concerned about the well-being, happiness or goodness of 
life of any other people is considered as a serious deficiency 
of personhood. And arguably being taken by others as an 
end in oneself, or in other words as someone whose 
subjective well-being or happiness is intrinsically important, 
is as important an element of having the interpersonal status 
of a person in concrete social contexts as is being taken by 
others as someone who has authority on them.
7
 One may 
doubt whether it is even possible to take someone as having 
normative authority on one while at the same time not 
seeing her well-being or happiness as having any intrinsic 
importance. 
As to the question whether recognition in the two senses 
of respect and love can do both jobs mentioned above – both 
make us persons in the first place, and make our lives better 
in various ways – the answer is, I suggest, affirmative. As to 
the ontological perspective, not only can they be seen as 
constitutive of what it is to be a person in the above laid out 
sense, it is clearly also causally important for the normal 
development of the psychological person-making capacities 
that one is taken as a person by others in the ways of respect 
and love. And from the qualitative point of view, it is not 
difficult to defend the claim that within the life-form of 
persons (as we know it as participants in it), as a rule, more 
mutual respect and mutual intrinsic concern makes up 
functionally better (harmonious, stable etc.) psychological 
and social life, nor is it very difficult to defend the claim 
                                                 
6 By ‟volitional response‟ I mean a response to something given 
that transforms the responder‟s basic motivations. In brief: on my 
account the attitudes of recognition – both respect and love – are 
motivational states that transcend the immediate animal 
motivations such as immediate desires for something given. 
7 On the relation of psychological personhood to interpersonal and 
institutional statuses of a person, see Ikäheimo 2007. 
that more of them makes, as a rule, ethically better persons 
and collectives.  
But how strong a claim can one plausibly make regarding 
the importance of recognition in the development of the 
normal psychological makeup of a person? In what follows, 
I will briefly explore the possibility that the recognitive 
attitudes of respect and love have an empirically necessary 
role in the human infant‟s entering into relationships of pre-
linguistic triadic communication – namely into the 
cooperative practice of pointing things to others. 
2. Recognitive attitudes in communicative 
pointing 
The primatologist and anthropologist Michael Tomasello, 
with his research group at the Max Planck Institute of 
Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, has recently done 
extensive research on the pre-linguistic triadic 
communicative practice of pointing things to others 
(paradigmatically with the index-finger). According to 
Tomasello (2006, 507), there is not one single reliable 
observation of a chimpanzee or any other ape ever having 
pointed anything to another ape. Nor do chimpanzees seem 
to understand humans pointing things to them. In contrast, 
normal human infants at around their first birthday are able 
to understand others pointing to them as well as able to 
point things to others (507-8). Pointing is a significant 
phenomenon since it is a way of intentionally creating 
triadic structures of joint reference, and thereby becoming to 
attend the world in ways that are shared and jointly 
controllable. There is good reason to believe that this 
provides an important background for the practice of 
symbolic communication and thereby for the further 
development of cognitive capacities that distinguish humans 
from those animals that lack symbolic communication (see 
Moll 2007). 
Criticizing and elaborating on the classic view on the 
different forms of pointing (Bates et al., 1975), Tomasello 
claims that there are three basic forms of, or proto-speech 
acts performed in infant pointing: „requesting‟, „informing‟ 
and „sharing‟ (Tomasello 2008, 83-8; see also Liszkowski 
2006). A paradigmatic case of requesting by pointing is 
when an infant points something to an adult with the intent 
that the adult would give it to her. A paradigmatic case of 
informing is when an infant points something to an adult 
that the infant believes is interesting or useful to the adult. In 
sharing by pointing the infant wants to share emotions or 
attitudes about an object with the addressee. In what 
follows, I will mostly focus on requesting and say briefly 
something about informing towards the end. What is 
common to both of these proto-speech acts is the 
phenomenon of helping: requesting is requesting the other to 
help, and informing is offering help. 
Why is it that our closest non-human relatives apparently 
neither point things to each other, nor understand when 
humans try to point something to them? They certainly do 
not lack the rather simple motor skill to extend their arm and 
index-finger to point at something. As to their cognitive 
capacities, on Tomasello‟s view they also do not lack the 
capacity to grasp others as intentional beings and interpret 
the directedness of their intentionality. In other words, they 
do have capacities of mind-reading enabling them to 
understand what another ape or human perceives or aims at 
in familiar enough situations (Tomasello 2006, 506-7; 
Tomasello 2008, 176-7; Moll 2007, 38-40). One possibility 
is that they lack the more demanding capacity of recursive 
mind-reading (reading the other reading one‟s mind, reading 
the other reading one reading her mind, and so forth, 
Tomasello 2008, 321, 335-7). But importantly, even if 
chimpanzees would have this capacity – which in principle 
makes it possible for one to grasp that the other intends to 
affect one‟s mind by pointing, as well as makes it possible 
to grasp the possibility of affecting the other‟s mind by 
pointing so that she knows one is trying to do this (which is 
what Tomasello calls “Gricean communication” after Grice 
1957) – communicative pointing could not exists as a 
practice among them if they lacked appropriate motivations 
and expectations concerning each other‟s motivations. That 
is, in order to get the practice of pointing off the ground – at 
least in the requesting and informing modes – subjects need 
to have motivations to help, as well as expect each other to 
have such motivation. Is this something chimpanzees lack, 
as Tomasello suggests (2006, 516)? 
One way to formulate the question is to ask whether 
chimpanzees lack motivation to act in ways that are 
altruistic and/or expectations that others would act 
altruistically. But we need conceptual caution here. First, 
one needs to distinguish between behavioral and 
motivational (or psychological) senses of „altruism‟.8 In the 
behavioral sense altruism is a property of behavior attributed 
regardless of what motivates the behavior: in this view 
altruistic behavior is simply behavior of A that is beneficial 
to B, regardless of whether A wants to benefit B. In the 
motivational sense altruism is a property of motivation: 
Altruistic motivation is motivation of A to behave or act in a 
way that A conceives as beneficial to B and costly to 
herself. On this concept also behavior or action is altruistic 
only if it is motivated by altruistic motives.
9
  
Secondly, the motivational concept of altruism still allows 
for a looser and stricter variant. On the looser concept 
motivation is altruistic regardless of whether it is conditional 
on the subject conceiving the costs to herself as an 
investment for some (often future) gain to itself, or not. 
Some investment-considerations are involved in all 
instrumental action: the agent aims at some goal that she 
sees worthwhile and will choose means or instruments 
whose costs in her view do not outweigh the benefits of the 
goal. Thus, A may be motivated to help B since A believes 
this will increase the likelihood of B, or some others, 
                                                 
8 See Dixon 2005. There is also normative or ethical altruism in 
contrast to normative or ethical egoism, but this need not concern 
us here. 
9 Thus when for example Jesse Prinz (2007, 247) notes that 
“[a]ltruistic behavior is everywhere in nature”, he uses “altruism” 
in the behavioral, not motivational sense. 
helping her when needed, and estimates that the benefit of 
this likelihood outweigh the costs incurred by helping B. Let 
us call this instrumental motivational altruism. 
On the stricter concept however, this is not an altruistic 
but on the contrary an egoistic motive to help the other. It is 
helping because of an expected gain to oneself. In contrast, a 
genuinely altruistic motive to help on the stricter concept is 
one that is not conditional on expected gain to oneself. Such 
a motive to help is non-instrumental in the sense that the 
good of the other (or the helping behavior)
10
 is not merely 
instrumentally valuable for the helper in light of the further 
end of benefit to herself. On the contrary, it is intrinsically 
valuable for her and thus provides an intrinsic motivation to 
help; in other words, it provides a motivation that is 
„immediate‟ in the sense of not derived from any further 
end. Let us call this intrinsic motivational altruism. 
Assuming that one observes apparently altruistic behavior 
among animals or humans, the first question from a 
philosophical point of view is whether what is at issue is 
merely behavioral altruism, or motivational altruism; and if 
it is motivational altruism, whether it is instrumental or 
intrinsic motivational altruism. Also, if one interprets what 
one observes as helping, it is important to be clear on which 
exact concept of helping. In the loosest (causal) sense of the 
word sun and rain help plants to grow. Secondly, in still a 
rather loose (behavioral) sense animals help other animals 
when they behave in ways that are advantageous to the 
others, or in other words when their behavior is altruistic in 
the behavioral sense. But thirdly, on what is clearly the 
intuitively default sense of the word, „helping‟ is a term for 
intentional action where the helper intends her action to 
result in something advantageous to the other. If this is the 
case, one still needs to ask whether the helper‟s motives are 
instrumentally or intrinsically altruistic.
11
 
An interesting question is whether instrumental 
motivational altruism and expectations about others being 
instrumentally altruistic would be enough to get and keep 
practices of requestive and informative pointing going, or 
whether (some degree of) intrinsically altruist motivation is 
necessarily required? If the latter would turn out to be the 
case, this could help in sharpening the focus on the question 
why apes do not point (compare Tomasello 2006, 516), but 
human infants do.
12
 One could allow the possibility that 
                                                 
10 Note that if the helper‟s end is benefit to herself, then sometimes 
even feigning to help may be enough, since this may trigger 
reciprocation. Thus, there can be cases where a subject shows 
„helping behavior‟ in expectation of reciprocation without aiming 
at benefiting the other at all. 
11 Compare Joyce (2006, 13-14), who defines altruism according to 
what I mean by intrinsic motivational altruism, but helping 
behaviorally as “behaving in a way that benefits another 
individual”. 
12 In fact, captive chimpanzees are able to learn some behavior that 
resembles pointing, which however most probably does not have a 
communicative structure of a kind described below (Tomasello 
2006, 507). Compare Leavens et al. (2008) who defend the thesis 
that captive apes sometimes engage in “whole hand pointing” to 
humans, but who apparently do not grasp the difference between 
apes have instrumentally altruistic motives (and therefore be 
free of the burden of proof that they do not), while focusing 
on the hypothesis that they lack intrinsically altruistic 
motives and that this may be part of the explanation why 
they never engage in requestive or informative pointing.
13
 
In what follows, I will present some considerations in 
support of the hypothesis that intrinsic altruism is necessary 
for requestive and informative pointing. Minimally, I want 
to show that whether it is is a genuine question with 
consequences as to the proper way of thinking about the 
requirements and structure of these forms of pointing. Let 
me first elaborate a bit more on the concept of intrinsic 
motivational altruism. Above I have given a rather 
conventional explication of the concept of altruism where 
what I called intrinsic motivational altruism is wanting to do 
something that one thinks is good for the other out of 
intrinsic concern for her good. But in fact I believe that the 
wealth of intuitions that authors have tried to grasp with the 
concept of altruism would be better served by distinguishing 
between two phenomena. 
One is having an immediate or non-instrumental 
motivation to benefit the other, or in other words being 
immediately „moved‟ by something like the claim of her 
good, well-being or happiness. The other is an immediate or 
non-instrumental motivation to satisfy her will, or in other 
words being immediately „moved‟ by a claim of authority of 
hers on one. To give an illustration: the one is at stake when 
one is non-instrumentally motivated by someone‟s request 
or petition for something with the tone “please” or “I beg 
you”, whereas the other is at stake when one is non-
instrumentally motivated by someone‟s request or petition 
for something with the tone “you ought to” or “I command 
you”.  
Both are genuinely or ultimately other-regarding, or 
alter-istic motivational responses in that in neither does the 
motivation stem from some further consideration external to 
the simple „claim‟ that the other person, or confronting the 
other person, makes on one. The first is the „axiological‟ 
species of intrinsic motivational altruism, and is what I 
mean by love as a recognitive attitude; the second is the 
„deontological‟ species of intrinsic motivational altruism 
and is what I mean by respect as a recognitive attitude. With 
the risk of some intellectual muscle ache incurred by 
straining intuitions habitualized by the standard association 
of altruism with love and other axiological phenomena, I 
suggest a revision to the meaning of „altruism‟, or to be 
exact „intrinsic motivational altruism‟ so that it includes 
both of these genuinely or ultimately other-regarding 
motives or volitional responses. In other words, „intrinsic 
motivational altruism‟ is synonymous with „recognitive 
                                                                                  
trying to affect others through their mind (which is what captive 
apes seem to be doing) and trying to affect others communicatively 
(which is what Tomasello primarily means by „pointing‟). 
13 Tomasello (2008, 37) suggests that “apes are not motivated to 
help […] in the same way as humans” (emphasis H.I.), but does not 
say what is the way in question. I suggest that it is helping out of 
intrinsically altruistic motives. 
attitude‟, and these name a genus the species of which are 
love and respect. 
Now, the idea that recognitive attitudes are either 
necessary or at least very important for the normal 
development of a healthy human psyche plays an important 
role in contemporary discussions on recognition in social 
and political philosophy.
14
 But the devil is always in the 
details: what exactly is it that one means by „recognition‟ 
and which exact role in what exactly in the human 
ontogenesis one is claiming it has? Let us accept the 
definitions for recognition cum intrinsic altruism in the 
forms of love and respect given above, and let us focus on 
the question what role they might have in the coming about 
of requestive and informative pointing in infants. Let me 
cite Tomasello‟s rendering of an interesting experiment by 
Helen Schwe and Ellen Markman. 
 
[…] Schwe and Markman (1997) had an adult 
respond to the request of two-year-olds by, among other 
things, refusing them or misunderstanding them. When 
the child‟s request was refused she was not happy and 
displayed this in various ways. But when her request 
was misunderstood – even in cases in which the adult 
actually gave her what she wanted unintentionally 
(“You want this (wrong object)? You can‟t have it but 
you can have this one (right object) instead.”) – the 
child was not fully satisfied and often repeated her 
request. Under this [Tomasello‟s, H.I.] interpretation, 
infants from a certain age are pointing imperatively not 
as a blind procedure for making things happen, but as a 
request that the adult know her goal and decide to help 
her attain it. (Tomasello 2006, 511-512) 
 
Tomasello takes this description as revealing of the structure 
of full-fledged requestive pointing in children, which in his 
view is not merely an attempt to influence the other‟s 
behavior through her mind, but an attempt to influence her 
behavior through her mind by letting her know that one is 
trying to influence it. Thus, it has a roughly Gricean 
communicative structure involving something like “I want 
you to know that I want something from you” (Tomasello 
2008, 88). Tomasello interprets this in terms of the child 
“informing the adult of [one‟s] desire” so that the adult 
would “agree to cooperate” (123) or “decide to help [one] 
fulfill it” (84). According to Tomasello this is not “ordering” 
the other, which he interprets as the mere attempt to causally 
influence the other through her mind – something apes may 
do with their „warning‟ signals (84). 
I believe Tomasello is mistakenly identifying here two 
different distinctions. First of these is between, on the one 
hand, attempting to influence others causally through their 
minds (“getting others do what one wants them to” (84)), 
and, on the other hand, attempting to influence them 
communicatively (letting them know that one wants them to 
                                                 
14 Especially important in this regard are Honneth 1995 (chapters 4 
& 5), and Honneth 2008, 40-52. 
do something by making it overt that this is what one is 
trying to do).
15
 The second distinction is between, on the 
one hand, “ordering”, and, on the other hand, what 
Tomasello calls communicatively “informing” the other of 
one‟s “desire”.  
Contrary to what Tomasello suggests, “ordering”, at least 
in the default sense of the word, is clearly not a mere 
attempt to influence the other causally through her mind 
(like, say, screaming so that the other would feel an 
immediate urge to flee), but as much a communicative act as 
communicatively informing the other of one‟s desire is. 
Consequently, we need to divide the general communicative 
act of „requesting‟ into two species and distinguish both 
from not genuinely communicative ways to affect the minds 
of others by signals. Accordingly, there are two different 
communicative intentions that may be at issue in the 
experiment by Schwe and Markman. 
In both cases the child wants that the adult‟s motivation to 
help stems from what the child is trying to communicate to 
her – and this is why she is not satisfied when the adult 
gives her the right object, yet apparently with some other 
motivation. But what exactly it is that the child is trying to 
communicate can in principle be either her need, or her will. 
(Of course it can be both, but let us focus on the pure cases 
to grasp the contrast clearly.) In the first form of request I 
want that your motivation to give me that thing stems from 
my needing it. In the second form of request I want that 
your motivation to give me that thing stems from my 
wanting that you do so. Let us call the first form of request 
appeal and the second form command. 
Notice now that in both forms an action by the addressee 
that satisfies the request must be motivated by what the 
addressor tries to communicate – either her need or her will 
– but that in both cases this still leaves open whether the 
motivation can or must stem from this mediately or 
immediately, or in other words whether it can or must be 
instrumental or intrinsic motivation. One may be motivated 
to satisfy the need of the other and thus to support her well-
being either because her well-being is likely to be somehow 
beneficial to oneself (or third persons one cares about 
intrinsically), or by the immediate, non-instrumental 
volitional response of concern for her well-being, or love 
that is. Analogously, one may be motivated to satisfy the 
will of the other either because obeying her is likely to be 
beneficial to oneself (or third persons) in some way (and 
resisting perhaps harmful), or by the immediate, non-
instrumental volitional response to her as having some 
authority on one, or respect that is.
16
 
                                                 
15 There is also an intermediate form, which is attempting to 
influence others by letting them know that one wants them to do 
something without making it overt that this is what one is trying to 
do. See Tomasello 2008, 90. 
16 Note that I mean „authority‟ here in an emphatically 
interpersonal sense, independent of institutional positions or 
powers that give people various kinds of institutionally enforced 
claims or institutionally backed „authority‟. 
The central question for my purposes is whether the child 
expects that the adult be intrinsically motivated by what she 
is communicating – or in other words motivated by 
recognition in the sense of respect and/or love for her. To 
answer the question empirically one would need to device 
experiments premised on the distinctions made above 
between the axiological dimension of need, well-being and 
so on, and the deontological dimension of will, authority 
and so on, as well as between instrumental and intrinsic 
motives on both dimension. In lack of such experiments, or 
at least my knowledge of them, I will continue in the 
philosopher‟s armchair and rephrase the question: does a 
child at two years expect that the adult responds to her 
requestive pointing out of recognition for her (in the exact 
sense spelled out above), or in other words, does she 
interpret the adult’s response as revealing either 
recognition or lack of it? It is clear that instrumental 
motives are ubiquitous in everyday communication, and 
thus if children would expect adults to be completely devoid 
of them, they would be seriously out of touch with reality. 
But of course they can‟t be, lest they are to develop a highly 
dysfunctional relation to others. The question is thus 
whether the adult‟s apparently having only instrumental 
motives would satisfy the infant‟s request made by 
requestive pointing. This is a question not to be settled by 
philosophers but by empirical research. 
Importantly, according to Tomasello there is not enough 
evidence to warrant an attribution of a fully (Gricean) 
communicative structure to infant pointing right from the 
beginning, that is, at around the first birthday (2008, 144). 
Hence we are perhaps also not warranted to attribute much 
in the way of distinctiveness in the expectations that infants 
have with regard to the adult‟s motivations when they start 
pointing things to them at 12 months. A year later however 
children are apparently capable of distinguishing at least 
between a response to requestive pointing motivated by the 
content of a request and a response otherwise motivated – as 
the experiment by Schwe and Markman shows. But can they 
distinguish between instrumental and intrinsic motivation by 
the content of the request? 
If one accepts that the concept of love, as explicated 
above, applies anywhere in reality, then the least 
controversial claim is certainly that it applies in the typical 
relations of human parents to their children. We expect that 
parents love their children in the sense that they have (also) 
intrinsic concern for their well-being and happiness, and we 
think that this is the case in non-pathological parent-child-
relationships. I assume that we are right to do so. As to 
respect, there is an analogical claim to be made. Any rule or 
norm governing interaction is indeterminate in the sense of 
requiring specification in its application to concrete cases. 
That the content of norms is specified in application means 
that anyone acting on norms has some authority on them. 
Consequently, there is practically nothing children can learn 
from adults that would not require an active effort of 
interpretation and application by the child, and thereby some 
amount of her sharing authority with the adult.
17
 This is as 
true of semantic norms as it is of good manners or moral 
norms. To the extent that parents manage to teach their 
children anything, or interact with them in ways from which 
the infant can learn almost anything at all, they have to 
acknowledge this truth in the way that they interact with 
their children. Further, it seems extremely unlikely that such 
interaction would be fluent and thus well-functioning 
without at least a significant part of the adult‟s acceptance of 
the child‟s claim for authority being immediate or non-
instrumental. In other words, due to the ontology of norm-
governed interaction parents have to have at least some non-
instrumental acknowledgement or acceptance of the child‟s 
authority, or in other words some respect for the child. 
Arguably then, it is part of the normal social environment 
of the developing human infant that caretakers act with 
regard to them out of at least some intrinsically altruistic 
motivation, or at least partly out of love and respect that is. 
Thus, by the time infants become capable of discerning 
between different relevant motivations of others – whether 
this is at 12 months, 24 months, or somewhere in between – 
it should be part of their default horizon of expectations that 
they are objects of these intrinsic motives. Therefore it 
would not be surprising if it would turn out that at this point 
they normally expect others to have intrinsic motives to 
respond to their requestive pointing: in requestive pointing 
of the „appealing‟ sub-type intrinsic concern for the child‟s 
needs and well-being, and in requestive pointing of the 
„commanding‟ sub-type intrinsic acknowledgement of the 
child‟s authority.18 
Of course other possibilities cannot be ruled out a priori. 
First, there is the possibility, even if intuitively a rather 
unlikely one, that infants expect that the relevant others have 
also intrinsically altruistic motives, yet respond to 
requestive pointing for instrumental motives. Secondly, 
there is the intuitively perhaps less unlikely possibility that 
infants expect that others respond to their requestive 
pointing sometimes for intrinsically, other times for 
instrumentally altruistic motives; and, thirdly, that they 
expect that others usually respond for mixed motives. 
However, there is at least one consideration that speaks for 
attributing intrinsically altruistic motives a necessary role in 
infant pointing. 
Requestive pointing is generally speaking a cognitively 
highly demanding practice. Add to this a need to estimate 
whether the other is instrumentally motivated to do 
                                                 
17 This is emphasized in a very illuminating way by Pirmin 
Stekeler-Weithofer (2007 and (forthcoming)). 
18 I assume here that respect for the other as having authority on 
norms, and respect for the other as issuer of commands are 
instances of the same phenomenon, which is that of being 
intrinsically moved by the will of the other. My hypothesis is that 
participation in communication, requiring at least some minimal 
amount of respect for the other as sharing authority on norms with 
oneself, thus prepares one to experiencing the „commanding 
requests‟ by the other as motivating. Whether action follows of 
course depends on the subject‟s total motivational set. 
something one wants her to do, whether there is a gain for 
the other in helping that would be motivating for her, or 
what is it that the other might expect in return as a prize for 
her instrumental altruism. That is, add to the other cognitive 
requirements of requestive pointing (most importantly 
recursive mind-reading) the requirement to deliberate on 
chains of instrumental reasons that the other may, or may 
not, have – and you may have set a task cognitively so 
demanding that learning its execution is simply too difficult 
for any existing species of animals.
19
 
So here‟s the proposal. Perhaps a decisive privilege that 
human children have over their ape relatives is that they are 
free of the burden of having to consider their relevant 
others‟ instrumental motives in everything they do with 
them, and can often simply rely on their being motivated to 
respond positively to one‟s needs or will immediately, 
regardless of instrumental considerations. 
And whatever the developmental details, perhaps this is 
also the default way in which the normal human child 
responds to the requestive pointing of others, as well as the 
child‟s default mode of being motivated when she starts 
helping others by pointing: not out of cognitively 
demanding mediate or instrumental motives, but 
immediately or intrinsically simply by being moved by the 
„claim‟ of the other‟s need and/or will on oneself (when the 
child is capable of having a rudimentary cognitive grasp of 
these of course). This is to suggest that perhaps intrinsic 
motivational altruism is (at least part of) the explanation for 
why communicative pointing apparently “comes naturally” 
to infants,
20
 whereas other currently existing animals never 
engage in it. 
In whatever way it has come about, and whatever are the 
requirements for its reproduction, perhaps the human 
capacity for recognitive attitudes, for being immediately 
motivated by others, simplifies things between humans, 
unburdens their interaction from excessive cognitive 
demands, and thereby gives them an advantage thanks to 
which they are able to make the decisive step into the realm 
of genuine Gricean communication – first by pointing and 
later in the even more complex symbolic mode. 
In other words, perhaps the recognitive attitudes of 
respect and love are what gets the normal members of one 
                                                 
19 Note that we are not dealing with instinct-driven coordination of 
behavior that may arise without any intersubjective expectations, 
but about action with a means-end-structure. The point is that if 
some animals are capable of interaction where they have 
expectations concerning each other‟s motives in the first place, 
then their cognitive task will be significantly easier if they can, at 
least in some important matters, tacitly rely on the respective 
others‟ having intrinsically altruistic motives. 
20 In Tomasello‟s (2008, 112) view, infants do not learn pointing 
by imitation, but it “comes naturally to them in some way”. It 
would be useful to know whether the child‟s propensity to help by 
pointing is affected by „appealing‟ or „commanding‟ expressions 
by the other. Also, it would be useful to know whether 
expectations for rewards or sanctions for helping or not helping by 
pointing play some role, and if so, which role exactly. Compare 
Warneken & Tomasello 2008. 
animal species, the human, over their animal motivational 
solipsism, and, by enabling them to engage in complex 
forms of communication, emancipates them from cognitive 
solipsism more generally and thereby launches them into the 
developmental path normally leading to full-fledged 
psychological personhood. This of course does not rule out 
that a more intelligent species of animals could start Gricean 
communication by orienting in a space of exclusively 
instrumental reasons. But for the most intelligent currently 
existing species this may be just too difficult.
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